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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING 
PLAINTIFF'S PRESENT WIFE'S INCOME IN 
DETERMINING THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES HAD TAKEN PLACE FOR PURPOSES 
OF MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
In support of her position that the trial court may consider a new spouse's income for 
purposes of determining modifications of child support and alimony obligations, defendant 
cites Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992). That case is inapposite because 
it applies to awards of attorney's fees and costs, not child support and alimony. In Crockett, 
the petitioner sought an increase in child support and an order applying the increase 
retroactively. The trial court increased the child support by $900 a month, but denied the 
request to apply the award retroactively as well as petitioner's request for attorney's fees and 
costs in the amount of $23,679.66. 
On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court should not have considered her new 
husband's income in determining that she had no financial need for assistance with her 
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attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the legislature, by enacting UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.4, had prohibited the trial courts from considering a new spouse's 
income in setting child support obligations, overruling Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
1980). But the court noted that the legislature had not placed a similar prohibition on 
considering a new spouse's income in determining whether to award attorney's fees and 
costs. The court stated: "We therefore similarly hold that a trial court is not precluded as a 
matter of law from considering the income of a receiving parent's new spouse when 
determining the receiving parent's 'need'for costs and attorney fees." Crockett, 836 P.2d at 
822 (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court evidently considered the income of plaintiffs new spouse when 
considering both child support and alimony. In the minute entry denying the plaintiffs 
petition, the court does not distinguish between child support and alimony—the court simply 
says: "The Petition is denied." Record at 589. The findings of fact recite that "Plaintiff s 
present wife, Susan, has a base salary of $3,000.00 per month from Scotia Engineering." 
Record at 638, f 5. (Susan, however, testified that at the time of the trial on November 30, 
1992, she had actually received only $17,700 for the year 1992-an average of $1,609 a 
month-although she should have received a base of $3,000 a month. In prior years, her 
income was even less. Transcript at 107). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp. 1992), specifically prohibits the trial court 
from considering a new spouse's income for purposes of determining child support: 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share 
of the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of 
the child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
(Emphasis added). 
Defendant argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.4 (1992) merely precludes the 
trial court from using a new spouse's income in calculating the child support award under the 
uniform child support guidelines-the trial court is not precluded from considering a new 
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spouse's income in cases where the guidelines are rebutted. Defendant points to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-45-7(3), which instructs the trial court to consider "the standard of living 
and situation of the parties" and "the relative wealth and income of the parties" in 
establishing a support award where there is sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines. 
Defendant contends that measurement of the parties' standard of living necessitates 
consideration of a new spouse's contribution to the standard of living of the parties under 
§ 78-45-7(3). The Court of Appeals has already rejected a similar argument in Ebbert v. 
Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987). In Ebbert, the father contended that the wealth of the 
mother's parents, who made large gifts of money to the mother during the marriage, should 
have been considered by the trial court when establishing the amount of child support under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7. The court stated: 
Such a consideration would be tantamount to imputing the wealth and income 
of her parents to defendant, and thereby imposing a duty of child support on 
the grandparents. Such a result is contrary to the concepts of parental duty 
and common sense. 
Id. at 1023. 
The trial court's consideration of plaintiffs wife's income is tantamount to imputing her 
income to plaintiff, thereby imposing a duty upon her to support plaintiffs child and ex-wife. 
Such a result is contrary to common sense and concepts of the duties of a new spouse to the 
former spouse and children of the former marriage. 
Defendant also cites UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 in support of her argument that 
the legislature did not intend to prevent stepparents from having any obligation to support 
the stepchild. Section 78-45-4.1 provides: 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a 
natural or adoptive parent is required to support a child. Provided, however, 
that upon the termination of the marriage or common law relationship 
between the stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the support 
obligation shall terminate. 
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(Emphasis added.) Section 78-45-4.1 does not help defendant—section 78-45-2(14) defines 
"stepparent" as "a person ceremonially married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial 
parent. . . ." (Emphasis added). Thus, the stepparent's duty of support does not apply to 
persons married to the noncustodial parent, such as plaintiffs new wife. 
In addition, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 conforms to federal regulations pertaining 
to eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-a child who lives with 
both a parent and stepparent is not a "dependent child" for purposes of AFDC, if under state 
law of general applicability, stepparents are required to support stepchildren to the same 
extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children. See Concerned 
Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982) (holding that the State of 
Utah lawfully terminated AFDC benefits for stepchildren). Further, under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-45-4.2, stepparents may sue natural parents for indemnification of support 
payments which the stepparents have made. Id. at 634. Section 78-45-4.2 provides: 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or 
adoptive parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a 
stepparent has the same right to recover support for a stepchild from the 
natural or adoptive parent as any other obligee. 
Thus, the legislature's main intent in enacting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 was to force 
stepchildren to look to a stepparent living with the custodial parent for support, rather than 
AFDC or other public welfare programs. 
Defendant's argument that the legislature did not mean entirely to prohibit the court 
from considering a new spouse's income when making and modifying awards of child 
support fails completely. Here, the trial court obviously considered plaintiffs wife's income 
when denying the petition to decrease child support and that consideration was error. 
The trial court also erred in considering plaintiffs present wife's income in denying 
plaintiffs petition to modify the alimony award. In Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court merely held that, when placed in context, the trial court did 
not err in considering the appellant's present wife's income and separate assets in 
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determining the appellant's ability to pay spousal support-the court did not hold that it is 
always proper for the trial court to consider the new spouse's income, as defendant argues. 
Paffel at 101-102. 
In this case, the trial court should not have relied on Paffel since it is fundamentally 
different from the present case. In Paffel, the appellant's inclusion of his wife's expenses 
while excluding her income from his statements about his finances was patently unfair and 
deceptive-it was not just a "mere difference in numbers" as defendant asserts. Appellee's 
Brief at 8. The Utah Supreme Court felt that the appellant's own behavior justified the trial 
court's consideration of appellant's present wife's income and assets. Id. at 102. 
In Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of Appeals observed that 
the appellee's new wife drew a salary from a closely-held corporation in which the appellee 
was virtually the sole owner. The court noted: 
We do not suggest that the new wife's income should be added to 
Husband's stated salary. However, the new wife's income most likely 
relieves Husband of a portion of his stated expenses. 
Id. n. 1 at 741. In this case, where plaintiff carefully separated his present wife's expenses 
from those of his own, the trial court erred in adding her income to his in deciding that his 
financial circumstances have not changed from the.time of the divorce decree. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADDING PLAINTIFF'S 
TRAVEL AND ENTERTAINMENT BENEFITS TO HIS 
SALARY WHERE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD THAT PLAINTIFF'S BENEFITS HAD CHANGED 
Defendant contends that the trial court correctly considered the value of plaintiffs 
employment benefits to determine that no substantial change in circumstances had occurred. 
Defendant argues: 
The trial court found that the Plaintiffs business perquisites constituted a 
substantial benefit, requiring an upward adjustment of his stated income. 
After adjusting the stated income to include the employment benefits, the trial 
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court found that there was no substantial change in Plaintiffs circumstances. 
These determinations are all correct in fact and law. Muir v. Muir. supra. 
Appellee's Brief at 9. (Emphasis added). 
Actually the trial court never did place a value on plaintiffs business perquisites. In 
the findings of fact, the court recites: "In addition to the Plaintiffs salary, he receives a car, 
medical insurance and an entertainment allowance which he uses for entertaining clients, but 
which also pays for his travel and entertainment." Record at 638. The court made no further 
findings as to the worth of these benefits or whether such benefits had increased since the 
time of the divorce decree. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that the trial court may take into consideration the value of 
employer-provided benefits when determining a party's income. The problem with the trial 
court's findings and conclusions are that they do not go far enough—a mere finding that 
plaintiff receives benefits does not lead inexorably to a conclusion that these benefits should 
be added to plaintiffs stated income. The court also should be required to find whether the 
benefits have changed since the time of the divorce decree. If the benefits have remained the 
same, then the precise value of the benefits have little relevance to a determination of 
whether there has been a material change in circumstances. 
Here, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiffs benefits had changed since the 
time the divorce decree was entered-in fact, plaintiff testified he still drove the same 
company car (a Cadillac purchased in 1988) he drove at the time of the divorce in February 
1991. Transcript at 108, 116. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, one could infer 
safely that plaintiffs level of travel and entertainment on behalf of the company was about 
the same in November 1992, as it had been two years before in February 1991. Plaintiff 
stipulated that his expenses were the same—the only change in plaintiffs circumstances is 
that his salary decreased by $1,500 a month. 
Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to respond to discovery requests for "detailed 
expense records." Appellee's Brief at 12. This statement is utterly false-defendant never 
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made any discovery requests. Transcript at 93-94; See Index to Record on Appeal. 
Defendant served a trial subpoena on Warren Barber, an officer of plaintiffs employer, 
commanding him to bring the 1991 corporate income tax returns, company financial 
statements, and the "Entertainment Expense Ledger for 1992" to the trial Record at 586-
587. At the trial, defendant's attorney attempted to conduct the discovery that he should 
have completed during the year the petition to modify the decree was pending. Transcript at 
94-96. Understandably, the trial court grew very impatient with counsel's attempt to 
establish who-ate-what-meal-with-whom-and-where for each entry in the ledger through a 
witness who also, understandably, could not remember the details of each lunch he had eaten 
during the past year. Transcript at 81, 96-97. Once plaintiff had produced evidence that his 
salary had substantially decreased, the burden of proof shifted to defendant to come forward 
with evidence that plaintiffs circumstances had not changed, considering other factors 
applicable to his financial situation, including his benefits. Transcript 83, 95. It was not 
plaintiffs burden to prove a negative; that is, that reimbursement for business expenses 
should not be added to his income. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO DEFENDANT 
Defendant cites Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992) in support of her 
argument that the attorney's fee award should be upheld despite the fact that the court failed 
to make specific findings regarding plaintiffs ability to pay the attorney's fees, defendant's 
financial need to have assistance with the attorney's fees, or the reasonableness of the fees. 
Lyngle has no application to this case, even in principle--Z,>?2g/e was a suit to enforce the 
provisions of a divorce decree, not a suit to modify the decree. In response to the husband's 
claim that an award of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence of the wife's financial 
need, the court responded: 
Husband fails to comprehend the nature of these proceedings. In this suit, 
Wife is not seeking to obtain or modify a divorce decree but to enforce the 
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provisions of a decree she obtained in 1986. In an action to enforce the 
provisions of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is based solely upon 
the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the moving 
party. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
Id. at 1030. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in considering plaintiffs present wife's income in denying 
plaintiffs petition to modify the divorce decree by reducing his child support and alimony 
obligation. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.4 specifically prohibits a trial court from 
considering a new spouse's income in making child support awards. It was inappropriate for 
the court to consider plaintiffs wife's income in refusing to modify the alimony award where 
plaintiff excluded his wife's expenses from those of his own in the evidence presented to the 
court. 
The trial court was not required to determine the precise value of plaintiffs 
employer-provided benefits in determining whether plaintiffs ability to pay alimony had 
materially changed, where the record is devoid of any evidence that the benefits had 
increased from the time of the decree. Defendant also failed to establish that the benefits 
had value. In any case, defendant's failure to conduct any discovery on the issue of benefits 
cannot be attributed to plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained his burden of proving that his income 
had decreased, causing a material change in his financial circumstances. 
The trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to defendant without making the 
requisite findings regarding the plaintiffs ability to pay, defendant's financial need, and the 
reasonableness of the fees, and without finding that defendant was even obligated to pay 
attorney's fees. 
The court should reverse the decision of the trial court denying plaintiffs motion to 
reduce his child support and alimony obligation and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's 
attorney's fees. 
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DATED this 7 day of October. 1993. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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